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INTRODUCTION 
Floods are the most expensive form of natural disaster in the United States.1
Climate change and population growth are likely to lead in the coming decades to 
more severe, frequent, and costly floods.2 How we pay for flood losses is an urgent 
public policy issue. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) provides most 
of the flood insurance policies on homes in the United States.3 The U.S. Flood 
Insurance Program is a complex scheme that uses insurance coverage subsidies, 
mandates, and other tools to support various policies related to floods;4 in other 
words, it uses insurance to govern.5 Yet, the governance of the NFIP is limited; 
powerful factors constrain its impact, and the policies it furthers have long been 
criticized.6 This Article first showcases key aspects of the NFIP, including its 
structure and goals.7 Then it shifts to consider constraints on the almost fifty-year- 
old NFIP8 and outlines the current status of this program.9 Finally, it considers what 
sort of federal governmental involvement with insurance would be better for 
dealing with homeowners’ flood risk than the current system.10 In trying to reform 
the NFIP, Congress has gone in circles between 2012 and 2014 and will again 
1. Flood Insurance, INS. INFO. INST. (Nov. 2015), http://www.iii.org/issue-update/flood- 
insurance   [https://perma.cc/9FTL-5GGT]. 
2. See, e.g.,  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-359T, HIGH-RISK SERIES: AN 
UPDATE 1, 14–20, 61–74 (2013) (adding to the GAO’s high-risk list the following: “Limiting the Federal 
Government’s Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks”); FEMA, 2011-OPPA-01, 
FEMA CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION POLICY STATEMENT (2011) (outlining the agency-wide 
directive too integrate climate change adaptation planning, including planning for more intense storms, 
extreme flooding, and higher sea levels in its processes); AECOM, THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
AND POPULATION GROWTH ON THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM THROUGH 2100 
(2013). 
3. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-497T, GAO’S HIGH RISK PROGRAM
(2006); Flood Insurance, supra note 1. 
4. See infra Part I.
5. An important literature has developed in recent years, largely focused on private insurance,
which conceptualizes insurance as governance. See generally RICHARD V. ERICSON, AARON DOYLE & 
DEAN BARRY, INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE (2003); Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 
161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 683–93 (2013). United States federal flood insurance, which is publicly 
underwritten yet privately purchased, is also an example of insurance as governance. In this Article, I 
use a broad conception of governance and governing that embraces incentives and impacts of 
insurance, as well as explicit rules and regulations. 
6. See, e.g., Jennifer Wriggins, Flood Money: The Challenge of U.S. Flood Insurance Reform in a Warming
World, 119 PENN. ST. L. REV. 361, 384–97 (2014). 
7. See infra Sections I.A., I.B. For a more detailed discussion regarding federal flood insurance,
see Wriggins, supra note 6. 
8. See infra Section I.C.
9. See infra Section I.D. 
10. See infra Part II.
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consider reforms in 2017.11 Risk-based rates based on state-of-the-art maps and a 
small, means-based voucher program rather than the current general subsidies are 
reforms that both make sense and would be workable if introduced gradually.12 A 
comprehensive plan to address rising sea levels and other aspects of climate change 
is also a necessary, although unlikely, reform. In the meantime, a better flood 
insurance program can begin to steer us in the right direction.13 
 
I.  THE NFIP: BASIC BACKGROUND 
The NFIP, founded in 1968, was a product of the Great Society and the shift 
in government risk management that evolved from the 1930s to the 1960s.14 In this 
shift, the federal government took an active role in managing and spreading risks 
that previously had been shouldered by individuals and localities.15 Federal disaster 
relief, which had begun in 1927 with a devastating Mississippi flood, had been 
ballooning.16 Congress hoped its new program would result in lower disaster relief 
bills by making development safer or guiding development away from flood-prone 
areas and by bearing and sharing flood risk among the residents of risky areas who 
purchased insurance.17 Congress also aimed to supply flood insurance “in flood- 
prone areas to property owners who otherwise would not be able to obtain it” under 
“reasonable” terms and conditions18 but failed to define the meaning of 
“reasonable.”19 To encourage participation in the new program, it provided deep 
subsidies for the oldest, highest-risk properties.20 Congress also envisioned that a 
 
 
 
11. The 2012 reforms were known as the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, 
Pub. L. No. 112-141, §§ 100201–49, 126 Stat. 405, 916–69 (2012) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
4001–4130 (2012)). Then, in 2014, Congress passed the Menendez-Grimm Homeowners’ Flood 
Insurance Affordability Act of 2014. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. 
No. 113-89, §§ 3–4, 128 Stat. 1020, 1021–22 (2014) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4014(g), 4015). 
12. See infra Section II.A–D. 
13. See infra Section II.A–C. 
14. DAVID MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 
258–62 (2002). 
15. Id. 
16. Wriggins, supra note 6, at 372–73. 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2012); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-631T, 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS 
FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES (2010) [hereinafter NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED]; 
see HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER ET AL., AT WAR WITH THE WEATHER: MANAGING LARGE-SCALE 
RISKS IN A NEW ERA OF CATASTROPHES 84 (2009); Wriggins, supra note 6, at 375. 
18. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a). 
19. Id. 
20. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-607, FLOOD INSURANCE: 
MORE INFORMATION NEEDED ON SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES (2013) [hereinafter MORE 
INFORMATION NEEDED]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-297, FEMA ACTION 
NEEDED TO IMPROVE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 52 
(2011) [hereinafter FEMA ACTION NEEDED] (reporting that rates for older properties in high-risk 
zones are forty to forty-five percent of what full risk rates would be); FEMA, QUESTIONS ABOUT THE 
BIGGERT-WATERS FLOOD INSURANCE REFORM ACT OF 2012 (n.d.), http://www.fema.gov/media- 
library-data/20130726-1912-25045-9380/bw12_qa_04_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SEA-QNN7]; 
Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. 
REV. 3, 15–16 (2007). 
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unified national floodplain management plan would eventually be developed and 
passed.21 
 
A. Broad Structure of the NFIP 
The NFIP is a complex governmental insurance program with both public and 
private aspects. First, the federal government has chosen to make flood insurance 
coverage available to homeowners, covering a risk that the private market was not 
insuring when the law establishing the NFIP passed in 1968.22 Although it may 
seem surprising now, the NFIP was designed to run a deficit during years when 
floods were huge.23 Deficits would be funded through loans from the Treasury 
Department.24 Currently, the deficit is twenty-four billion dollars with no 
expectation it will be paid back without changes in the program.25 Second, risk 
reduction policies were a part of the NFIP from the beginning. For example, the 
NFIP made the availability of flood insurance to communities contingent on the 
passing of risk reduction ordinances in those communities.26 If communities passed 
ordinances acceptable to the NFIP, such as requiring new construction to be 
elevated in a flood zone, residents of these communities would be able to buy 
federal flood insurance. In addition, the NFIP provided funds to participating 
communities for risk reduction.27 This arrangement of offering flood insurance, 
which was unavailable on the market, to communities that adopted policies aimed 
at reducing flood risk comprises the basic structure of the NFIP. 
 
B. Other Key Aspects of the NFIP: Mandates, Subsidies, and Consequences 
The federal government, by selling flood insurance, has decided to sell a 
product that people must be forced to buy even when it is sold at less than half 
price. When Congress created the NFIP in 1968, it assumed that communities 
would voluntarily participate in the federal flood program, and that homeowners 
would eagerly buy flood insurance, which had previously been unavailable. Congress 
even required deep subsidies for policies on the highest-risk properties, including 
second homes and homes that had repeatedly suffered flood losses.28 These high- 
 
 
 
 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(c). 
22. MOSS, supra note 14, at 262; Scales, supra note 20, at 7. 
23. See NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17, at 6 (“As we have pointed out, 
the number of policies receiving subsidized rates has grown steadily in recent years and without changes 
to the program will likely continue to grow, increasing the potential for future NFIP operating 
deficits.”). 
24. Id. 
25. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-127, FLOOD INSURANCE: STRATEGIES 
FOR INCREASING PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT 1 (2014) [hereinafter FLOOD INSURANCE: 
STRATEGIES]. 
26. KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 84–85; Scales, supra note 20, at 12. 
27. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-429T, FLOOD INSURANCE: PUBLIC 
POLICY GOALS PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM (2011) [hereinafter PUBLIC POLICY GOALS]. 
28. The subsidized rates charged by the NFIP are estimated as between thirty-five and forty- 
five percent of what risk-based rates would be. FEMA ACTION NEEDED, supra note 20, at 52 (reporting 
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risk properties were homes that had been built in flood-prone areas without flood 
risk in mind and before flood maps had been developed.29 But because community 
and homeowner interest was minimal, the program would have quickly failed 
without reform.30 
Congress in the 1970s and 1980s reformed the program by adding mandates 
for homeowners and banks.31 Homeowners in high-risk zones who had mortgages 
were required to keep flood insurance for the life of the mortgage; similarly, banks 
had to ensure flood insurance was retained for the duration of all loans in flood 
zones.32 The goal was for the mandates to help create a pool of funds out of which 
flood losses could be paid. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which administered 
the program, later expanded the subsidies for policies on high-risk properties.33 
FEMA decided, for example, that when flood maps changed in such a way that a 
property, which had been located in a low-risk zone, was remapped into a high-risk 
zone, the initial lower rate would continue to apply to the property.34 These types 
of subsidies, known as grandfathering subsidies, meant that even more high-risk 
properties were charged rates below their risk, and thus that the program’s deficits 
were likely to be greater in the event of large floods.35 
The mandates are a straightforward mechanism by which Congress governs 
through insurance, where individuals are required to participate in a specific risk- 
 
 
 
that rates for older properties in high-risk zones are forty to forty-five percent of what full risk rates 
would be). 
29. MORE INFORMATION NEEDED, supra note 20, at 1, 9; Scales, supra note 20, at 42. The 
subsidies are known as pre-FIRM, or pre-Flood Insurance Rate Map, subsidies. 
30. See NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17; KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 
17, at 86. 
31. See NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17; KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 
17, at 86. 
32. See NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17; KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 
17, at 86. For properties (mortgaged or unmortgaged) outside high-risk zones or unmortgaged 
properties within high-risk zones, there is no purchase mandate. Charlene Luke & Aviva Abramovsky, 
Managing the Next Deluge: A Tax System Approach to Flood Insurance, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 13–16 (2011). 
33. See Implementation of the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Act of 2012: One Year After Enactment: 
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Econ. Policy of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 
9–30 (2013) (written testimony of W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency) [hereinafter FEMA Administrator 2013 Written Testimony] (explaining types of subsidies); NFIP: 
CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17, at 7, 14. 
34. PUBLIC POLICY GOALS, supra note 27, at 3–4; Scales, supra note 20, at 15–16; FEMA 
Administrator 2013 Written Testimony, supra note 33, at 10. A related type of subsidy also known as a 
grandfathering subsidy was applied when a property was built in compliance with FEMA standards in 
a flood zone. When the risk of that zone increased even further, the property still would be charged 
lower rates based on the earlier compliance rather than the current risk. See FEMA Administrator 2013 
Written Testimony, supra note 33, at 10; see also NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17, at 
7, 14. This is the type of subsidy most commonly referred to as “grandfathering.” See NFIP: 
CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17, at 7. The “pre-FIRM” subsidies are sometimes referred 
to as “grandfathered” also. See FEMA Administrator 2013 Written Testimony, supra note 33, at 10. 
35. FEMA Administrator 2013 Written Testimony, supra note 33, at 10; PUBLIC POLICY GOALS, 
supra note 27, at 3–4; NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17, at 7, 14; Scales, supra note 
20, at 15. 
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spreading mechanism.36 The subsidies, too, are meant to incentivize the purchase 
of insurance. Congress assumes that encouraging the purchase of insurance is a 
good idea because it forces people to bear at least some of the costs of living where 
they do. As the reasoning goes, homeowners who share flood risk and thus have 
insurance for that risk will bear at least some of the costs of rebuilding following a 
flood. 
In providing deeply discounted rates on the oldest and riskiest properties, 
Congress discouraged replacing and mitigating these properties.37 In fact, 
Congress’s policies unfortunately encouraged homeowners to retain these 
properties.38 After floods, flood insurance benefits were often used to repair 
existing homes rather than replace them with new, more flood-resistant homes.39 
Thus, the number of older, risky homes remained higher than it would be if people 
actually had to pay the full cost of flood insurance on those homes.40 Many see this 
retention of older, risky homes as a negative effect of the insurance, leading to more 
losses in the long run.41 Federal regulations provided that if completed repairs or 
renovations were worth less than half of a home’s value, such home did not need 
to meet the standards for flood resistance after repairs.42 Not surprisingly, this 
created perverse incentives for property owners to minimize renovations so as not 
to be required to make homes more flood-resistant.43 When it created the flood 
program in 1968, Congress expected that the older housing stock on which it was 
giving subsidies would be replaced within approximately twenty-five years.44 But 
this has not happened. There are still about 3.5 million of these older structures and 
their turnover is very low.45 Relatedly, flood insurance has been found to inflate the 
market value of these older buildings, discouraging their replacement by newer, 
more flood-resistant structures.46 Thus, a negative consequence of the NFIP has 
 
 
 
 
36. See Abraham, supra note 5, at 683–93 (describing the conception of private insurance as 
“governing” its policyholders and in part acting as a surrogate government). See generally ERICSON, 
DOYLE & BARRY, supra note 5 at 43–65 (describing private insurance practices as creating a system of 
governance, including by collaboration with the federal government). 
37. Wriggins, supra note 6, at 393–95; see CAMILO SARMIENTO & TED R. MILLER, AM. INST. 
FOR RESEARCH, COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF FLOODING AND THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL 
FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM, at x (2006), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1602- 
20490-4555/nfip_eval_costs_and_consequences.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X3B-GLK6]; FRENCH 
WETMORE ET AL., AM. INST. FOR RESEARCH, THE EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT, at xi, 10, 12–14 (2006), http://www.fema.gov/media-library- 
data/20130726-1602-20490-1463/nfip_eval_final_report.pdf     [https://perma.cc/AZ5E-8FT5]. 
38. Wriggins, supra note 6, at 393–95; see SARMIENTO & MILLER, supra note 37, at x; WETMORE 
ET AL., supra note 37, at x, 10, 12–14. 
39. See SARMIENTO & MILLER, supra note 37, at vi–xiii; WETMORE ET AL., supra note 37, at 
22–24. 
40. See Wriggins, supra note 6, at 393–95. 
41. See id. 
42. 44 C.F.R. §§ 59.1, 60.3(c)(2) (2015). 
43. See WETMORE ET AL., supra note 37, at 22–24. 
44. Id. at 22. 
45. Id. at 22–23. 
46. SARMIENTO & MILLER, supra note 37, at x. 
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been the retention by private homeowners of older, less flood-resistant buildings in 
flood-prone areas. 
While the NFIP has encouraged private parties to build in flood-prone areas, 
it also has helped make new buildings in flood-prone areas more resistant to 
floods.47 For example, most new construction in high-risk areas is elevated in 
accordance with NFIP requirements.48 The NFIP’s actions have been estimated to 
reduce costs from flooding by about one billion dollars per year.49 However, the 
program has probably simultaneously encouraged building in flood-prone areas, 
putting more property at risk. While one of the program’s many goals was guiding 
development away from floodplains, the program has instead encouraged building 
in floodplains, albeit while making doing so safer.50 One consequence has been 
more new development in flood-prone areas than there would have been without 
the NFIP.51 
The NFIP has created maps showing flood risk throughout the United States. 
Prior to the federal flood program, there existed no mapping for flood risk, yet maps 
of flood risks are useful planning tools.52 The program developed rates based on its 
flood risk maps.53 Throughout its history, the mapping program has been 
underfunded, subject to political pressure, and technically subpar.54 Rates based on 
faulty maps are inherently suspect, and inferior mapping has contributed to a 
suspicion of, and hostility toward, the federal flood program.55 
 
C. Constraints on the NFIP 
The NFIP faces various limitations and constraints because of the structure 
of the U.S. government, the nature of the provided insurance, and the all-too- 
common human behavior toward risk, where people tend to underestimate the 
magnitude of low-probability, high-impact events like floods. 
 
 
 
 
47. WETMORE ET AL., supra note 37, at xi. 
48. Id. at 16. 
49. See id. at 9; SARMIENTO & MILLER, supra note 37, at 8. 
50. See WETMORE ET AL., supra note 37, at 12–20. See generally Wriggins, supra note 6, at 384–86. 
51. Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. 
REV. 61, 73, 160 (1985); see SARMIENTO & MILLER, supra note 37, at x; WETMORE ET AL., supra note 37, 
at x, 9, 12–14; Scales, supra note 20, at 13. 
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 4010(a) (2012) (administrator of NFIP required to identify flood risk zones 
within 5 years of 1968); NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17, at 7; KUNREUTHER ET 
AL., supra note 17, at 84–85; Houck, supra note 51, at 71 n.49 (stating accelerated mapping program 
passed in 1973), 74 (stating that FEMA prepares maps), 159 (stating program has evolved to at least 
the flood-map phase in thousands of communities); Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 32, at 18 n.94. 
53. See NFIP:CONTINUEDACTIONSNEEDED,supra note 17, at 7; KUNREUTHERETAL.,supra note 
137, at 84–85. 
54. See Houck, supra note 51, 159–63. 
55. See, e.g., Christie Thompson et al., Fed Flood Maps Left NY Unprepared for Sandy—and FEMA 
Knew It, WNYC RADIO (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.wnyc.org/story/fed-flood-maps-left-ny- 
unprepared-sandy-and-fema-knew-it [https://perma.cc/3CGP-FK7C]. Also, given the common human 
tendency to discount flood risk, see infra text accompanying notes 65–66, even accurate maps may be 
greeted by hostility by those who live in high-risk areas. 
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First, land use is primarily a local and state matter.56 The federal government 
cannot enforce local building codes.57 Enforcement of local building codes in flood- 
prone areas is sometimes lax.58 When the NFIP provides funds for local 
communities to make buildings more flood-resistant and the communities do not 
use the money for this purpose, NFIP cannot get its money back.59 Thus, the NFIP 
is underwriting a risk over which it has little control. 
Moreover, the NFIP has not been able to exclude high-risk properties from 
the pool or charge all high-risk properties a higher rate as a commercial insurer 
would.60 The law has strictly controlled the rates that can be charged for flood 
insurance.61 The NFIP has been required to sell insurance to all who will pay for 
it.62 For example, people in high-risk zones who do not have mortgages are 
voluntary purchasers; though their rates may be high, the NFIP cannot refuse to 
sell them insurance. While the NFIP might want to keep costs down by refusing to 
insure these high-risk properties, excluding them from the pool of insureds is not 
allowed by the law that establishes and defines the rules that govern the NFIP.63 
Second, the NFIP’s reach is limited due to common human behavior 
concerning risk.64 Despite the subsidies and mandates, people resist buying and 
retaining flood insurance, even when they live in high-risk areas. Banks often fail to 
ensure that borrowers have and retain flood insurance in flood zones. Much 
research has discussed resistance to buying flood insurance and the broader human 
tendency to underestimate the magnitude of low-probability, high-impact risks like 
floods.65 Floods can happen outside high-risk flood zones, and outside high-risk 
zones flood insurance is voluntary. Yet, people outside high-risk zones rarely buy 
flood insurance, even though it is inexpensive. The chronically low level of 
participation in the program despite the mandates is an important reason why the 
NFIP has deficits in addition to the subsidies. It does not have a deep pool of 
policyholders to pay for claims. 
 
 
56. KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 17; Scales, supra note 20, at 12. 
57. KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 17; Scales, supra note 20, at 43 n.134. 
58. KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 17. 
59. See, e.g., United States v. Parish of Saint Bernard, 756 F.2d 1116, 1127 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(limiting remedies of the United States against Louisiana public and private defendants for violating 
their obligations to adopt and enforce flood control measures, thus leading to massive flood damage). 
60. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-12, FLOOD INSURANCE: FEMA’S RATE- 
SETTING PROCESS WARRANTS ATTENTION 11–18 (2008) [hereinafter FEMA’S RATE-SETTING]; 
Scales, supra note 20, at 13. 
61. FEMA’S RATE-SETTING, supra note60. 
62. Id.; see NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17, at 1 (NFIP “cannot reject 
high-risk applicants.”); Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 32, at 16 (“The NFIP has no ability to deny 
coverage if individuals are eligible to purchase the insurance.”); Scales, supra note 20, at 13. 
63. See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 6 (2d ed. 2008) (describing adverse 
selection and the role of insurance as gatekeeper). 
64. See HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER, MARK V. PAULY & STACEY MCMORROW, INSURANCE 
AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: IMPROVING DECISIONS IN THE MOST MISUNDERSTOOD INDUSTRY 
71–72, 113–15 (2013); see also KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 16; Scales, supra note 20, at 13; 
Wriggins, supra note 6, at 390–93. 
65. See KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 64, at 71–72, 113–15; KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 
17, at 16; Scales, supra note 20, at 12–13; Wriggins, supra note 6, at 390–93. 
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The way the program has evolved to sell insurance reflects some of the 
limitations of the NFIP’s governance. Because of the low demand, Congress made 
a shift in 1983 for insurance to be sold by private companies that would receive a 
commission and claims adjustment expenses.66 Although the NFIP also sells 
insurance, the plan to have private companies sell the insurance was based on the 
idea that private companies sell it more effectively than the government.67 Despite 
this shift to private sales, participation in the program remains limited.68 
Disaster relief creates challenging dilemmas for flood insurance. Federal 
disaster relief, activated by a Presidential declaration and supplied by FEMA, 
includes both emergency assistance like rescues (also provided by state and local 
governments) and some housing assistance.69 This housing assistance includes aid 
to make damaged homes habitable as well as loans for repairs. FEMA tries to 
sharply distinguish between benefits provided by flood insurance and FEMA 
emergency housing benefits.70 One area of clear distinction is that FEMA provides 
temporary housing, whereas flood insurance does not.71 
However, other aspects of housing assistance are more difficult to distinguish. 
FEMA’s assistance to make homes habitable overlaps with flood insurance benefits 
that provide funds for repairs and reconstruction, which also helps to make homes 
habitable.72 FEMA (and the NFIP) requires that homeowners use flood insurance 
benefits before they can receive FEMA housing benefits.73 FEMA publicity urges 
 
 
66. See KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 85; LLOYD DIXON ET. AL., RAND CORP.,  THE 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM’S MARKET PENETRATION RATE 1 (2006), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR300.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4BEB-3D2H]  (describing  limited  demand  for  flood  insurance  and  reasons);  Scales, 
supra note 20, at 14. This is known as the “Write-Your-Own” (“WYO”) program, although it seems to 
be a misnomer because the policies are written by the NFIP. Scales, supra note 20, at 14. The companies 
collect premiums, enroll policyholders, and administer claims. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 4071 (2012). Private 
companies, selling federal policies, are referred to as “fiscal agents” of the federal government. See 42 
U.S.C. § 4071(a)(1) (2012). 
67. Scales, supra note 20, at 14–15. 
68. See DIXON ET AL., supra note 66, at 14 (estimating that forty-nine percent of eligible 
properties in high-risk flood areas actually had flood insurance, based on a sample). 
69. See Gregory J. Lake, Federal and State Disaster Response: An Introduction, 41 COLO. LAW. 95, 
95–96 (2012); FEMA, DISASTER ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE FROM FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/ 
disaster-assistance-available-fema          [https://web.archive.org/web/20160118015657/https://www. 
fema.gov/disaster-assistance-available-fema]  (last  visited  Jan.  18,  2016)  [hereinafter  DISASTER 
ASSISTANCE     AVAILABLE     FROM     FEMA];    FEMA,    WHAT     IS     DISASTER     ASSISTANCE?, 
http://www.fema.gov/what-disaster-assistance[https://web.archive.org/web/20151204165706/ 
http://www.fema.gov/what-disaster-assistance] (last visited Dec. 4, 2015) [hereinafter WHAT  IS 
DISASTER ASSISTANCE?]. 
70. See,  e.g.,  DISASTER  ASSISTANCE  AVAILABLE  FROM  FEMA,  supra  note  69;  WHAT  IS 
DISASTER ASSISTANCE?, supra note 69. 
71. See DIXON ET AL., supra note 66, at 54. 
72. Additional research on the overlap between flood insurance benefits and some types of 
disaster relief may reveal grounds for possible additional reforms. 
73. DISASTER ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE FROM FEMA, supra note 69; WHAT IS DISASTER 
ASSISTANCE?, supra note 69; see FEMA, DO I QUALIFY FOR ASSISTANCE?, http://www.fema.gov/do- 
i-qualify-assistance [https://perma.cc/9JSD-HWXC] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (“Please note: If your 
disaster damages are covered by your insurance policy, you must file a claim with your insurance 
company.”);  Is  Disaster  Help Available  If  I  Have  Insurance?, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/disaster-help- 
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purchase of flood insurance, rather than receipt of disaster relief benefits, claiming 
that insurance puts homeowners more in control than disaster relief does.74 
Nonetheless, as both flood insurance and FEMA benefits may provide assistance 
to make flood-damaged homes more habitable, there is duplication between the 
two. Further, receiving benefits under flood insurance policies is not easy; strict 
deadlines and documentation requirements apply.75 Press accounts after Hurricane 
Sandy featured some individuals who had flood insurance but wished they did not, 
since they thought they would have fared better had they relied on disaster relief.76 
Not surprisingly, the availability of federal disaster relief, which has become a 
political necessity, may have led to reduced demand for flood insurance.77 
D. The Current Situation of the NFIP 
Almost fifty years after the NFIP was founded, disaster relief costs are still 
soaring. Development has not been guided away from flood-prone areas. To the 
contrary, development has been encouraged in these areas, although NFIP 
requirements have made most new construction more flood-resistant. The heavily 
subsidized insurance for the oldest, highest-risk properties and other properties 
affected by map changes has discouraged their replacement. Human behavior 
toward flood risk has meant that people tend not to buy flood insurance voluntarily 
and let it lapse frequently. The low rate of participation in the program and massive 
storms such as Katrina and Sandy have led to huge, enduring deficits that are now 
widely seen as problematic. The NFIP cannot enforce local building codes, must 
limit its prices, and cannot exclude properties as too risky to insure. Federal disaster 
relief provides some housing assistance benefits that overlap with flood insurance, 
thereby undercutting incentives to purchase or retain flood insurance. 
The current NFIP and federal flood policy, painted in broad-brush here, are 
widely criticized.78 Further, climate change is likely to result in rising sea levels, larger 
 
available-if-i-have-insurance [http://web.archive.org/web/20150905092142/http://www.fema.gov/ 
disaster-help-available-if-i-have-insurance] (last updated Sept. 5, 2015) (stating that a claim must be filed 
with an insurance company before disaster help from FEMA can be considered). 
74. FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: THE BENEFITS OF FLOOD 
INSURANCE VERSUS DISASTER ASSISTANCE (2012), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/ 
20130726-1643-20490-9801/f_217_benefits_30nov2012_web.pdf     [https://perma.cc/V5SN-W76P]. 
75. Scales, supra note 20, at 14, 33. 
76. See, e.g., Alan Krawitz, After Flood Insurance Problems Persist, Some in South Queens, Rockaway Say 
They Feel They Would Have Fared Better Without It, FORUM (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://theforumnewsgroup.com/2014/01/09/after-flood-insurance-problems-persist-some-in- 
south-queens-rockaway-say-they-feel-they-would-have-fared-better-without-it/ [https://perma.cc/ 
PZ98-Y94Z]. 
77. ERWANN MICHEL-KERJAN, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON SMALL BUS. AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, HAVE WE ENTERED AN EVER-GROWING CYCLE ON GOVERNMENT 
DISASTER RELIEF? (2013), http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/US-Senate-Small-Business- 
Cte_2013Mar14_MichelKerjan.pdf    [https://perma.cc/V3MX-ZYXM]. 
78. Wriggins, supra note 6, at 393–97; see, e.g., Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi 
River Stories: Lessons from a Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471 (2007); Luke & 
Abramovsky, supra note 32; Scales, supra note 20. 
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storms, and more floods.79 In July 2012, Congress passed a law to reform the 
program, gradually eliminating all subsidies, moving to risk-based rates, and creating 
a plan for a reserve fund to cover catastrophe years.80 It also funded flood mapping 
and specified both that private flood insurance satisfied the mandates and that the 
NFIP could buy insurance to cover claims that were larger than its assets, which is 
known as reinsurance.81 If the NFIP has reinsurance, the reinsurance policy, rather 
than taxpayers, should cover claims when claims exceed capacity.82 Returning the 
NFIP to fiscal solvency was a widely accepted, dominant goal.83 The aim was to 
gradually have rates for flood insurance reflect actual flood risk. If homeowners 
were charged rates that reflected actual risk, the program would be fiscally sound 
going forward. After some of the 2012 reforms began to go into effect, the real 
estate industry and the potentially affected homeowners energetically lobbied 
Congress to stop the rate increases that would eventually ensue from removing 
subsidies.84 Congress responded by backtracking on some of the subsidy removals 
and made other changes in 2014.85 In 2017, Congress will revisit the program.86 The 
next section considers what sort of federal approach to flood insurance would 
improve the current situation. 
II.   BETTER FLOOD INSURANCE 
Between now and 2017 there exists an opportunity for widespread education 
about the risks and costs of climate change and floods. The public has a chance to 
consider what sort of approach to take to flood risk and federal flood insurance. 
Congress, the media, and the public now have time to consider and reframe the 
issues in a way that is more thoughtful than a panicked response to potential rate 
increases. This Section will consider what sort of insurance we should endorse for 
flood risk going forward. First, mapping should be adequately funded and protected 
from political influence. Second, subsidies should gradually be phased out and risk- 
based rates adopted for flood insurance. Third, a targeted affordability plan should 
 
79. Wriggins, supra note 6, at 366 n.15. 
80. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, §§ 100201–49, 
126 Stat. 405, 916–69 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4130 (2012)). 
81. See generally ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING 
INSURANCE LAW 998–99 (5th ed. 2012); NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, BIGGERT-WATERS FLOOD 
INSURANCE REFORM AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2012 (2012), http://www.naic.org/documents/ 
cipr_events_2012_cipr_summit_overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LL2-YBDB]; FEMA, supra note 
20. 
82. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 81, at 995. 
83. See generally MORE INFORMATION NEEDED, supra note 20, at 2; NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMM’RS., supra note 81; FEMA, supra note 20. 
84. Robert R. M. Verchick & Linsey R. Johnson, When Retreat Is the Best Option: Flood Insurance 
after Biggert-Waters and other Climate Change Puzzles, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 695, 711, 716 (2013); 
Wriggins, supra note 6, at 413–20 (analyzing the efforts to derail the 2012 reforms). 
85. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, §§ 3–4, 128 
Stat. 1020, 1021–22 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4014(g), 4015). 
86. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100203(b), 
126 Stat. 405, 916 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4026 (2012)). 
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be passed. Fourth, a comprehensive strategy should be developed to deal with the 
long-term effects of floods and climate change. 
A. Mapping Should Be Funded and Protected from Political Influence 
The mapping of flood risk must be based on the most precise scientific 
information available.87 At some point in the future, with computer mapping, flood 
risk information may be so widely available that the NFIP may not need to generate 
maps. That point has not yet been reached. Maps must be as accurate as possible so 
that the risk of flood can be gauged with maximum accuracy. In turn, an accurate 
estimation of flood risk can lead to an accurate calculation of premiums based on 
it. If the premiums are based on accurate risk predictions, then the program should 
not run deficits. Opponents of rate reform have been able to point to the mapping 
program’s weakness as a way to attack suggested reforms, and excellent maps will 
foreclose this objection.88 
B. Subsidies Should Be Phased Out 
The remaining subsidies should be gradually phased out. Congress in 2014, to 
its credit, continued with the rollback of some of the subsidies. The longstanding 
subsidies for flood insurance policies on high-risk older homes (the pre-FIRM 
subsidies) applied not only to policies on primary residences but even to policies on 
second homes, businesses, and properties that had repeatedly suffered large losses. 
In 2014, Congress continued with the gradual elimination of those subsidies for 
policies on second homes, business properties, and severe repetitive loss 
properties.89 Those subsidies apply to about 425,000 properties.90 However, 
approximately 715,000 subsidized policies on high-risk properties remain and were 
renewed by Congress in 2014.91 These subsidies apply to primary residences and 
 
87. For more discussion of mapping, see Wriggins, supra note 6, at 401–02, 408, 421–22. 
Provisions about mapping in BW-12 and MG-14 include Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act 
of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, §§ 100216(b)(1)(A)(iii), 100216(b)(1)(C). 
88. See, e.g., FEMA’S RATE-SETTING, supra note 60, at 16–17, 30; see also, e.g., NFIP: 
CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17, at 7; KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 16; Luke & 
Abramovsky, supra note 32, at 9–10; STOP FEMA NOW, http://www.stopfemanow.com 
[https://perma.cc/C2X5-TXUC] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
89. The 2012 reforms eliminated subsidies for 438,000 policyholders—for second homes, 
businesses, and severe repetitive loss properties. MORE INFORMATION NEEDED, supra note 20, at 12. 
The 2014 reforms continued with the elimination of these subsidies. See FEMA, HOMEOWNER FLOOD 
INSURANCE AFFORDABILITY ACT: OVERVIEW (2014), http://www.fema.gov/media-library- 
data/1396551935597-4048b68f6d695a6eb6e6e7118d3ce464/HFIAA_Overview_FINAL_03282014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F3HZ-677H]. But 715,000 subsidized properties remained. MORE INFORMATION 
NEEDED, supra note 20, at 12. Policy holders who had subsidized policies for nonprimary residences, 
businesses, and severe repetitive loss properties (a total of five percent of flood policyholders) received 
twenty-five percent premium increases starting January 1, 2013. FEMA, supra note 20, at 1–2. “Severe 
repetitive loss” properties are defined as single family residences that have suffered flood damage for 
which four or more claims have been made, each greater than $5000 or at least two claims have been 
made with the total amount exceeding the value of the property. 42 U.S.C. § 4104c(h)(1)(B) (2012). 
90. MORE INFORMATION NEEDED, supra note 20, at 12–13. 
91. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 § 4 (“Restoration of Grandfathered 
Rates”). This provision repealed section 1308 of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (codified 
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also to some properties that have become more high risk over the years—the 
grandfathering subsidies mentioned above. These subsidies should end for several 
reasons. First, risk-based rates will probably bring private competition and state 
insurance regulation; competition and state regulation will likely be overall more 
efficient and better for consumers than the current system. Second, the 
justifications for continuing these subsidies are specious. Third, other areas of the 
federal government’s involvement in insurance are far more compelling from a 
policy standpoint than flood insurance. Fourth, the incentives created by the 
subsidies make little sense, particularly given climate change risks. Instead of the 
current subsidies, there should be a voucher program which is means-tested and 
narrow. Finally, Congress should develop a plan to face the realities of climate 
change, including rising sea levels. 
 
1. Risk-Based Rates Will Be Positive and Probably Bring Increased Private Competition 
The federal government’s deeply subsidized rates have hampered the private 
market’s ability to provide basic homeowners flood coverage and have inhibited 
private competition.92 While flood risk is a difficult, correlated risk that the private 
market has been reluctant to cover, private insurance may become more widespread 
if the federal government reduces subsidies and improves mapping. Interestingly, 
Lloyds of London is offering some basic private flood insurance in Florida, which 
in some instances is cheaper than coverage through the NFIP.93 Private insurers are 
better at some aspects of risk reduction than governments.94 If rates become based 
on risk, better risk modeling information will probably become available, thus 
furthering competition between private insurers.95 Private insurers may be able to 
provide more variety in policies as well as more nuanced rate making, better data, 
and individualized risk management. If private insurance begins to cover this risk, 
consumer-friendly state insurance law doctrines will begin to apply.96 Even an 
expansion of the private market will not mean an absence of a federal role. The 
federal government may need to be involved in an affordability program, discussed 
below, as well as perhaps playing a role in providing reinsurance.97 
 
at 42 U.S.C. § 4001 et seq.), which required premium adjustments to reflect the current risk of flood 
based on updated maps and stated that premiums could rise twenty percent per year following new 
flood maps. Id.; National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 4015(h) (2012) (repealed 2014). 
92. See FLOOD INSURANCE: STRATEGIES, supra note 25, at 5–6. 
93. See Jeff Harrington, Battling Flood Insurance Rate Hikes Without Government Help, TAMPA BAY 
TIMES  ( Jan. 12, 2014, 12:49 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/banking/battling- 
flood-insurance-rate-hikes-without-government-help/2160697       [https://perma.cc/N5YC-ZXR3] 
(reporting that Lloyd’s of London is now offering flood insurance in Florida). 
94. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral 
Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 224 n.85 (2012) (providing example of private insurers using hurricane 
shutters to reduce insurance premiums). 
95. Of course, as risk modeling becomes more granular and individualized, difficult questions 
of cross-subsidization may come to the fore. 
96. See Scales, supra note 20, at 33–34. 
97. FLOOD INSURANCE: STRATEGIES, supra note 25, at 21–22. 
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2. The Justifications for Continuing the Subsidies Are Specious 
Second, the justification for the subsidies has not been persuasively made. 
Subsidy proponents have not made arguments on the merits as to why the subsidies 
are a positive idea, except to say that flood insurance rates should not be too high.98 
The original justification for the subsidies, encouraging participation in the 
program, is stale and no longer valid.99  The subsidies are not based on need or 
income. They are based on factors such as the age of the house, its location, 
mapping history, and risk.100 The subsidies were originally instituted to encourage 
participation in a new program and were expected to last for twenty-five years, by 
which time the older properties would be replaced by newer, more flood-resistant 
ones.101 However, the older properties have endured and in some cases increased 
substantially in value.102 The real estate industry in coastal areas, we can assume, 
relies to some degree on the availability of affordable flood insurance.103 But the 
proponents of these enduring subsidies on primary residences and grandfathering 
subsidies have not explained why they, along with the real estate industry in their 
areas, should receive these particular subsidies. Nor have they articulated why deeply 
discounted, federally supplied property insurance should be denied to homeowners 
outside high-risk coastal or riverine areas. 
Not all subsidies are the same, and not all risks should be spread across all 
taxpayers. The way in which the federal government spreads flood risk makes little 
sense now. This is not to say that the government generally should return all widely 
spread risks to the backs of individuals.104 Rather, one can oppose some of the ways 
in which the government has returned risk to individuals in recent decades, such as 
the shrinking of retirement security, and also oppose the way government spreads 
flood risk.105 
3. Other Arenas of Federal Government Involvement with Insurance Reflect More Compelling Policy 
Justifications than Flood Insurance 
If we consider three areas where the federal government has been involved 
with insurance, we can see that the case for continuing federal subsidies is much 
more problematic. One context is the Urban Property Insurance Protection and 
 
98. See Wriggins, supra note 6, at 413–17, 414 n.322. 
99. Congress initiated the subsidies when it founded the program in order to encourage 
participation in the program. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 20, at 1, 9; FEMA, 
supra note 20, at 7; Scales, supra note 20, at 16. 
100. MORE INFORMATION NEEDED, supra note 20, at 2 n.2; FEMA ACTION NEEDED, supra 
note 20, at 52 (2011) (reporting that rates for older properties in high-risk zones are forty to forty-five 
percent of what full risk rates would be). 
101. WETMORE ET AL., supra note 37, at 12–20. 
102. Id. 
103. Witness the real estate industry’s passionate opposition to the 2012 changes in the flood 
insurance law. See Editorial, Flooding Capitol Hill: Republicans Cave to the Realtors on Taxpayer Flood Insurance, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2014, at A16. 
104. See generally SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, SHARED RISK: GOVERNMENT, MARKETS, AND 
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ( Jacob S. Hacker & Ann O’Leary eds., 2012). 
105. Id. 
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Reinsurance Act of 1968 (UPIPRA).106 This law, passed in 1968, was aimed at the 
challenges posed by a lack of insurance in urban areas both before and after the 
urban riots of 1966.107 This law authorized states to pass statutes known as Fair 
Access to Insurance Requirements plans (FAIR plans) and provided federal riot 
reinsurance to companies that participated in FAIR plans.108 The major goal of 
these plans was to make affordable property insurance more available in urban 
areas.109 These plans varied according to state laws but needed to meet basic federal 
requirements in order for companies to receive federal reinsurance for riots.110 
Eventually, private reinsurers returned to the market and Congress terminated 
the riot reinsurance program in 1985.111 Now, the standard policies of homeowners 
cover riots.112  UPIPRA aimed to deal with a national emergency of widespread 
urban decline that threatened the survival of U.S. cities. Insurance companies had 
been refusing to insure properties in large areas of cities, particularly those inhabited 
by minorities; this refusal to insure contributed significantly to the decline of these 
large urban areas. Individuals who owned property in these areas often were simply 
unable to obtain insurance. States and cities did not have the resources to deal with 
the situation.113 The federal government’s involvement was limited in scope, finite 
in duration, and targeted a beneficial goal. The federal government did not take over 
the entire underwriting risk, but rather created incentives for states to prod 
insurance companies to take on some of the risk because of the importance of the 
coverage. 
Flood insurance contrasts unfavorably with this example. The federal 
government has entirely underwritten flood risk for homeowners, the subsidies 
have endured for decades, federal involvement is widely seen as having led to 
significant negative consequences such as retaining risky properties that otherwise 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
106. Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 555
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1749bbb–1749bbb-21 (1976)), amended by Housing and Community
Development Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-557, 92 Stat. 2080 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12, 15, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)). 
107. PRESIDENT’S NAT’L ADVISORY PANEL ON INS. IN RIOT-AFFECTED AREAS, MEETING
THE INSURANCE CRISIS OF OUR CITIES, at ii–iii (1968) [hereinafter ADVISORY PANEL ON INS
REPORT]; Joanne Dwyer, Fair Plans: History, Holtzman and the Arson-for-Profit Hazard, 7 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 617, 617, 622–23, 626 (1978); Alan S. Kaplinsky, Insurance in Urban Areas: An Analysis of Recent 
Statutory Solutions, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 650, 662 (1969). 
108. Dwyer, supra note 107, at 621–22. 
109. Urban Property Insurance Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968 § 1103. 
110. Dwyer, supra note 107, at 621–28. 
111. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb(b) (omitted); BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42716, 
TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE 8 (2013). 
112. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-179, HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE: 
MULTIPLE CHALLENGES MAKE EXPANDING PRIVATE COVERAGE DIFFICULT 9 (2014) [hereinafter 
HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE]. 
113. ADVISORY PANEL ON INS. REPORT, supra note 107, at 32; Dwyer, supra note 107, at 617. 
The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders set up the distinct National Advisory Panel on 
Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas, which later endorsed the report of the Advisory Panel on Insurance. 
NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 197–99 (1968); Dwyer, supra note 107, at 617. 
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would have been replaced, and the risk that the federal government has shouldered 
is one that many homeowners choose to face. 
A second area of instructive contrast is federal unemployment insurance. 
Passed in 1935, the law establishing federal unemployment insurance aimed to fill 
a void in the private market. There was no private unemployment insurance 
available on the market, apparently because of concern about the challenge of 
distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary employment and moral hazard.114 
The structure was a payroll tax on the majority of employees; those who participated 
in a satisfactory state unemployment insurance program could deduct the full 
amount of their state contributions from the federal tax.115 The goal was to help 
stabilize the economy and lessen individual hardship from job loss that was not an 
individual’s fault.116 Payments from states are supplemented by the federal 
government at times of economic hardship.117 Many aspects of the program can be 
questioned, but the need for stabilizing the economy was and sometimes is 
compelling.118 States, cities, employers, and the private market lack the resources to 
deal with the economic consequences of widespread unemployment, and federal 
unemployment insurance helps stabilize the economy.119 Federal unemployment 
insurance spreads a risk that is not within the control of individuals and that almost 
everyone faces. 
The third example is the Affordable Care Act that was passed in 2010 when 
40 million Americans did not have health insurance.120 Although it may be difficult 
to remember now, this was a time when there was a consensus across the political 
spectrum that the private health insurance market was not working well and that 
reform was needed so that more individuals could have health insurance.121 While 
concerns were raised about costs, bureaucracy, and so on, this is a context where 
government’s involvement in insurance markets made sense. The risk of illness— 
 
114. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 75TH ANNIVERSARY, 
http://www.dol.gov/ocia/pdf/75th-Anniversary-Summary-FINAL.pdf         [https://perma.cc/VR77- 
YH6R] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016); MOSS, supra note 14, at 197–98. 
115. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 114; MOSS, supra note 14, at 191. 
116. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 114. 
117. See, e.g., Wesley Lowery, Advocates Renew Efforts to Urge Congress to Extend Unemployment 
Benefits,  WASH.  POST  ( June  10,  2014),  http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/advocates-renew- 
efforts-to-urge-congress-to-extend-unemployment-benefits/2014/06/10/2224da50-eff0-11e3-914c- 
1fbd0614e2d4_story.html    [https://perma.cc/8YXR-UEH3]. 
118. See Brian D. Galle, Myopia, Fiscal Federalism, and Unemployment Insurance: Time to Reform 
UI Financing 2–3 (Boston College Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 265, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2031728; Arthur Delaney, Conservatives Credit End 
of Benefits for Declining Unemployment Rate, HUFFINGTON POST POLITICS ( July 7, 2014, 4:17 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/07unemployment-extension_n_5564019.html 
[https://perma.cc/B54F-SM9G]. 
119. See Galle, supra note 118, at 2–3. 
120. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2612 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); Brief for Health Care for 
All, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398), 2012 
WL 160242. 
121. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARZ, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 12 (5th 
ed. Supp. 2010). 
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though unevenly distributed—is universally shared and outside the control of 
individuals, and public health concerns support wide provision of healthcare to 
citizens.122 
These three contexts, insurance in urban areas, unemployment insurance, and 
the Affordable Care Act, present much more compelling reasons for the federal 
government’s involvement in insurance than does flood insurance. Even if there are 
strong reasons for the federal government’s involvement with flood insurance, the 
case for the present subsidies is weak. 
4. The Subsidies Create Negative Incentives that Are Unfair to the General Public 
The third major reason why the subsidies should gradually be phased out is 
that the incentives they create are perverse, particularly given climate change. 
Existing subsidies incentivize citizens living in flood zones, particularly in older 
homes. The current rules encourage building in flood-prone areas, yet the federal 
government has no way to enforce land-use restrictions there. Given climate change 
and increasing disaster relief costs, there is no strong reason why these particular 
subsidies should continue. The subsidies and government rebuilding efforts permit 
homeowners and the real estate industry in flood-prone areas to avoid bearing the 
costs of the risks they face. Instead, all taxpayers, even those who are not living in 
flood-prone areas, ultimately share those ever-increasing costs. 
 
C. A Means-Tested Voucher Program Should Be Passed to Address Affordability Concerns 
Instead of the current subsidies, there should be a voucher program that is 
means tested and narrow. Flood insurance is both required and subsidized in high- 
risk zones. There are good reasons for the mandate,123 but weak reasons for the 
general subsidies, as explained above.124 Yet, for low-income residents of high-risk 
areas who have mortgages and are subject to the mandate, the gradual elimination 
of subsidies would be overly harsh. This raises concerns about affordability for 
some homeowners. The 2012 and 2014 reforms both require a National Academy 
of Sciences study to develop a possible affordability framework for flood 
insurance.125 The provisions about the study, which is intended to set the stage for 
the affordability framework, are complex and unlikely to result in a clear answer as 
to what Congress should do about affordability. It would be a mistake for Congress 
to wait for the affordability study without independently considering what it should 
do about the issue. 
 
122. Space constraints prevent detailed discussion of these points. For a comparative 
perspective, see generally T.R. REID, THE HEALING OF AMERICA: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR BETTER, 
CHEAPER, AND FAIRER HEALTH CARE (2010). 
123. See supra notes 30–33 (reasons for mandates), 37–46 (effects of subsidies), 92–122 (reasons 
for phasing out subsidies) and accompanying text. 
124. See supra Section II.B. 
125. See Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 
§ 100236(b), 126 Stat. 957 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4130 (2012)); Wriggins, supra 
note 6, at 400–01, 406–08. 
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One response to the affordability concern is to say that if the cost of owning 
an asset becomes too high, the owner can generally sell it. High insurance costs 
based on the riskiness of a particular property could simply be seen as a market 
signal. However, not all flood-prone areas are desirable, and selling may not always 
be an option. Some areas may become blighted if rates are based on risk.126 Virtually 
everyone involved in flood insurance reform calls for consideration of affordability 
issues in government insurance policy in this context, although the rationales for 
these calls are often left unarticulated.127 What are the arguments for an affordability 
program for flood insurance? Expert Carolyn Kousky explains in discussing state 
natural catastrophe programs that there are basically three arguments. 
The first is a political response to subsidize “vocal, high-risk residents.”128 
This is essentially what Congress did when it restored the majority of subsidies and 
made other changes in 2014. However, with more time and education, there is hope 
for a more reflective response in the future. 
The second argument, Kousky explains, is the equity argument. She writes, 
“some low-income homeowners reside in high-hazard areas, and it is a government 
role to help these homeowners afford insurance, just as society subsidizes their food 
and health care.”129 
The third is an economic argument. She writes: 
[I]nsurance . . . is necessary for development, and some types of 
development must be in high-risk areas but provide economic 
spillovers that justify insurance subsidies. The extent to which this 
is the case is a difficult empirical question that to my knowledge 
has not been thoroughly addressed but would likely justify only 
very small and targeted subsidies in any event.130 
The federal flood insurance program, of course, offers not small and targeted 
subsidies but large and general subsidies. Assuming Kousky is correct, these 
subsidies would not be economically justified. 
 
126. See, e.g., JOHN O’NEILL & MARTIN O’NEILL, JOSEPH ROWNTREE FOUND., SOCIAL 
JUSTICE AND THE FUTURE OF FLOOD INSURANCE (2012), http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/ 
vulnerable-households-flood-insurance-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z55L-67MQ] (discussing 
UK flood insurance regime). 
127. See, e.g., SMARTERSAFER, BRACING FOR THE STORM: HOW TO REFORM US DISASTER 
POLICY TO PREPARE FOR A RISKIER FUTURE 3 (2015) (calling for subsidies only for those who truly 
cannot afford risk-based rates through a means-tested, time-limited, and transparent system outside the 
rate structure); Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, Implementing The National Flood 
Insurance Reform Act in a New Era of Catastrophes, Wharton Pub. Pol’y Initiative Issue Brief, Oct. 2013. 
128. CAROLYN   KOUSKY,  NO.  RFF  DP  10-30,  MANAGING   THE   RISK   OF   NATURAL 
CATASTROPHES: THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONING OF STATE INSURANCE PROGRAMS 14, 
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-10-30.pdf      [https://perma.cc/ 
CA97-XZCY]. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
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The only strong argument for subsidies, then, is the equity argument that 
would extend them to poor people as part of government’s role in subsidizing 
housing, health care, and food.131 The existing general flood insurance subsidies for 
older homes and grandfathered homes are not targeted at people with low incomes 
or limited assets. They cover some people in these situations, but also cover 
homeowners who are not poor or middle class. For example, wealthy people with 
older, oceanfront homes have received massive subsidies for almost fifty years. If 
their home is their primary residence, they still receive the subsidies with only small 
rate increases authorized by Congress. The rates for standard homeowners 
insurance (which does not cover floods) vary by type and degree of risk, including 
materials and probability of exposure to catastrophes.132 But flood risk enjoys a 
most favored risk status for no valid reason. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO), academic experts, and private 
organizations have charted a route out of the current untenable situation. They 
argue that Congress should eliminate subsidized rates gradually and charge risk- 
based rates to everyone but also fund a means-tested subsidy for some 
policyholders.133 The most specific plan was put forth by Prof. Howard Kunreuther 
and his colleagues, including Carolyn Kousky and Erwann Michel-Kerjan.134 They 
propose a means-tested program using vouchers coupled with loans for mitigation 
renovations.135 Even though many details would need to be worked out, and politics 
may prevent passage of such a plan, it would represent a significant improvement 
over the current situation. 
D. Congress Should Pass a Comprehensive Climate Change Plan 
Finally, Congress should pass a regulatory scheme to deal with floods and 
climate change.136 Even with the improvements suggested above, such as gradual 
removal of subsidies, if climate change and sea level rise predictions come to pass, 
the reforms will be insufficient. 
CONCLUSION 
Flood insurance presents few easy issues, particularly given increasing flood 
risks, structural limitations on federal power, human behavior towards flood risk, 
 
131. While moral hazard arguments are commonly raised in opposition to subsidies for poor 
people, see generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996), in this 
context these arguments ring particularly false since the enduring subsidies have not had a clear purpose 
or strong rationale other than to benefit “vocal high-risk residents,” KOUSKY, supra note 128. 
132. HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE, supra note 114, at 5. 
133. Carolyn Kousky & Howard Kunreuther, Addressing Affordability in the National Flood Insurance 
Program, J. EXTREME EVENTS , Aug. 2014, at 1450001-3; see KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 333. 
134. Kousky & Kunreuther, supra note 133, at 3. 
135. Id. at 1; see KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 333. 
136. The original law establishing the National Flood Insurance Program called for creation of 
a national floodplain management program, 42 U.S.C. § 4001(c), a goal that has not been realized. See, 
e.g., Josh Saks & Jimi Grande, Flood Insurance Vote Underscores Need for National Mitigation Strategy, ROLL 
CALL  (Apr.  21,  2014,  5:00  AM),  http://www.rollcall.com/news/flood_insurance_vote_underscores 
_need_for_national_mitigation_strategy-232238-1.html       [https://perma.cc/8BNF-R2XQ]. 
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and how politically challenging it is to take away government benefits after they 
have been given. But despite these challenges, we need to have a broader 
conversation about flood risk and how we are going to deal with it as a society. This 
conversation must take place between now and 2017, when Congress revisits the 
program. Continuation of the current government insurance regime, with its 
incentives to increase the amount of new property at risk and to retain older high- 
risk homes, makes little sense. Developing excellent maps, gradually moving to risk- 
based rates, and developing a needs-based voucher program would substantially 
improve the current system. Further, these improvements would begin to point us 
in the right general direction of dealing with the challenges presented by climate 
change. 
 
